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THE INTERPRETERS
Kenneth L. Karst*
JUSTICE AS 'TRANSLATION: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM. By James Boyd White. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1990. Pp. xvii, 301. $29.95.
In his 1984 book, When Words Lose Their Meaning, James Boyd
White 1 offered us a way of thinking about reading. A text's most important meanings, he concluded, are to be found in the relations the
writer and reader establish with each other, and in the larger communities that the text addresses and helps to shape. In Justice as Translation, White brings this way of thinking to bear on both the writing and
the reading of judicial opinions. He analyzes a number of opinions as
texts in which Justices2 not only compose new meanings for authoritative texts (the Constitution, statutes, judicial precedents) but also offer
new definitions of themselves, of their intended readers, and of their
communities (both the legal profession and the larger society). Justice
as Translation, like White's earlier work, provides a refreshing reminder that the humanities, despite the pummelling they have recently
endured, can be humane.
In writing an opinion, White says, a Justice necessarily acts as a
translator, seeking to find and to communicate meaning across cultural boundaries. Sometimes opinion writing closely approaches
translation in the conventional sense, transmitting meanings across
ethnic and other divisions in America's multicultural society. But, in
White's view, opinion writing is a form of translation even when the
ethnicity ingredient is absent. In every case, the Justice must seek to
penetrate the culture inhabited by those who wrote the authoritative
text, and seek to render the meaning of the text in the context of today's issues, embedded as they are in today's culture. The book begins
with White's views of language and its uses, turns to the judicial opinion as a work of "compositional art," and concludes with some general
observations on justice as translation.
'
Who among White's readers will not share his wistfulness as he
laments the difficulty of finding integration - of the society, of the self
- in our segmented world? But lamentation is neither the book's
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main mood nor its purpose. The opening chapters mark out a path
toward integration, one that begins in our perception and uses of language. White's examples of the ways in which "we" regard "our" language and use it are taken from the writings of academics and
professionals. He identifies two styles of thinking that impede integration. First is the notion that language is "transparent or neutral,
merely a way of pointing to something outside of itself" (p. ix). White
contests the view that language does its work when it conveys from
one mind to another "propositions" and "concepts," both of which
have meanings independent of language. This type of thinking and
speaking, he argues in Chapter Two, tends to channel us into discourse that is assertive, even imperialistic, and thus to divert us from
an important truth: that our own acculturation severely limits our
recognition of what counts as a concept and what counts as a reason.
Language that is abstract and theoretical lends itself to a linear, if-Athen-B sort of reasoning and inhibits more diffuse, literary ways of
grasping reality. The language of assertion thus projects its aggressive
and defensive spirit into the spheres of ethics and justice, with sad
consequences for a society of many cultures.
White's second linguistic target is the discourse of economics (ch.
3) - not the discourse of all economists, but the language of neoclassical microeconomics prevalent in the "law-and-economics" school.
This way of talking, White argues, routinely diminishes persons to
their roles in a system of exchange, regarding them as calculating machines or objects to be manipulated or both. In Chicagoese, everything - every thing and every value - is interchangeable with
everything else through the medium of exchange, and competition is
the pool in which we self-interested maximizers hunt our prey. To the
economist who says, "This way of speaking is not a picture of the
world but a set of models, a series of value-free hypotheses about
human behavior," White responds that the models have a way of taking over a world view. He uses economic discourse to illustrate one of
the book's main theses: that language is a way of being and acting in
the world, of assigning meaning to behavior and thus creating culture.
And the culture so created is anything but value-free; it promotes a
view that reduces persons to their wants, their calculated pursuit of
acquisition, and their competition for dominance.
Dissatisfied with both the economic and the conceptual-propositional forms of discourse, White proposes a more literary way of
thinking about and using language, not just in law but in all our social
life. He calls this style "intellectual integration" (ch. 1). Its modal
question is neither "What proposition are you advancing?" nor "How
much do I get?," but "Who are you [the writer] in this text, who am I
[the reader], and what kind of conversation do you seek to establish
between us?" (p. 39). White speaks of integration in a sense that has
become familiar to all of us in discussing race relations, to embrace a
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diversity of ways of thinking and talking and writing. In describing
the reading and writing of judicial opinions as examples of the art of
composition, he evokes a double meaning that resounds in the words
"compose" and "composite": "a putting together of two things to
make out of them a third, a new whole, with a meaning of its own" (p.
4). To compose a legal text is thus to engage in ethical and political
action in the world, to make a "gesture" that responds to earlier gestures and may one day evoke the making of new texts, further gestures
still.
White's concluding chapters, relating "the activity of translation"
to law and justice, also draw on his view of reading as the making of a
new text (chs. 11-12). Translation involves the effort to know and respond to another person and another language, but it also involves the
assertion of the translator's own self and language. The translator
must stand between two languages, must inhabit "a culture in the
space between cultures" (p. 244). A good translator understands the
impossibility of carrying a text's meaning from one language to another without loss or gain - understands that translation is the art of
composition, of "integration" in White's sense. What is required is the
establishment of the right relations between the initial writer and the
translator, between the two languages (and thus the two cultures), and
between the translator and the reader of the new, translated text.
This whole process is "a model of law and justice" (p. 230), exemplified in those judicial opinions that deserve to be called excellent.
For White, legal interpretation is translation, the composing of one
text in response to another. Like the translator, the interpreter must
be faithful to the original text and the culture that gave it birth, and
must take responsibility for interpreting that text's meaning in a new
context: its application to people in today's culture. Thus,
"[t]ranslation and justice ... are both ways of talking about right relations, and of two kinds simultaneously: relations with languages, relations with people" (p. 233). An opinion - any text - creates "an
Ideal Reader, the version of himself or herself that it asks each of its
readers to become" (p. 100). The root question for justice, like the
root question for translation, is "Who are we to each other?" (p. 233).
Bracketed by these introductory and closing discussions of language, law, and translation are seven chapters in which White elaborates his views through criticism of judicial opinions. To call these
analyses literary criticism is merely to underscore White's central thesis: that law is "at its heart an interpretive and compositional - and
in this sense a radically literary - activity[,] . . . a way of reading,
comparing, and criticizing authoritative texts, and, in so doing, . . .
constituting, through conversation, a community and a culture of a
certain kind" (p. 91). He sees the judicial opinion as central in this
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activity, "the main model of thought for the lawyers, ... the representative legal text" (p. 90).
What entitles a judicial opinion to be called excellent? White's answer is grounded in his conception of law as "inherently aspirational"
(p. 137) and therefore a compositional art. The corollary to that conception is an ample view of the authority and responsibility of judges
to translate authoritative texts by creating new meanings for our time.
A reader who generally shares those views oflaw and judging (as I do)
will find much that is congenial in White's analysis of excellence in
opinion writing. A reader with a more restricted view of the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking - say, a Henry Monaghan3 or a Robert
Bork4 - surely will be harder to persuade.
Let it not be thought that White ignores the weight of the authoritative texts. To the contrary, he chides judges who look past the language of the texts to find meaning in the intentions of those who wrote
them. White agrees that fidelity to a text implies an effort to understand how its meaning was shaped by the context of its times. What
he rejects is the claim that "the intention of the Framers" should take
precedence over this effort to interpret the text itself. He makes his
sharpest attack on this view in a criticism of Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in the Dred Scott case, 5 which is not only a clear-cut denial of
the Constitution's aspirational character (pp. 137-38) but an especially
perverse example of how a Justice can work backward from a conclusion about the case at hand to a premise about "original intent" (pp.
129-32).

White does not so much confront the legitimacy question raised by
the Borks and the Monaghans as make an end run around it. The
original intent argument, he says, comes into play only when the language of the text presents difficulties in the context of today's issue.
Necessarily, then, invocation of the Framers' supposed intentions is
itself an interpretive choice guided by the present issue - which, given
the difficulty of reading the text, the Framers almost certainly did not
consider. 6 Today's substantive preferences will intrude into this process no less than they do in a candid effort to translate the meaning of
the text for application to today's context. In White's view, reliance
on the Framers' intent, even when it is sincere, is an evasion of the
3. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117
(1978); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
4. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
5. Died Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. White has much in common with other critics of reliance on "original intent." See, e.g., L.
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); Brest, The Misconceived
Quest/or the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).
In this chapter White fits these criticisms into his larger theory of legal interpretation as
translation.
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difficulties of reading and the responsibility of a judge to exercise judgment (p. 135).
A related sin in opinion writing, says White, is the pretense that a
textual authority (the Constitution, the precedent) is speaking, and not
the judge. This kind of authoritarian opinion, here exemplified by
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 7 not only
denies the responsibility of the judge as translator/lawgiver, it also denies the possibility that the opinion will engage its readers in the further conversation that is the essence of lawmaking in a democracy (ch.
6).
In contrast, White applauds Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in
Olmstead as the product of a judge who is aware of his own potential
contributions to the growth of the law through sensible interpretation
of an old text (the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures) to apply to a new condition (communication by
telephone). Brandeis looks beyond the words of the text to seek its
deeper principles (the protection of privacy). In writing his opinion in
language that is accessible to nonlawyers, Brandeis establishes a footing of equality for himself and his readers, and invites a conversation
among citizens on the immediate subject (wiretapping by law enforcement officers) and on larger issues as well.
The authoritarian opinion has no such democratic aims; it suppresses all doubt as it suppresses the possibilities for conversation.
White appreciates not only the candor of a judge who, like Brandeis,
acknowledges his responsibility as a translator (p. 150), but also the
candor of a judge who imagines an Ideal Reader with a mind and
heart, one who is capable of thinking independently about the interpretive issues at hand (pp. 100-01). Such a judge will develop competing lines of argument, recognizing the force of positions opposed to
her own and "exposing to view what is most deeply problematic both
in our resources of legal meaning and in the case upon which they
bear" (p. 92). In Olmstead, Brandeis remarked that government is a
teacher; 8 White, congratulating Brandeis for respecting the reader's
capacity for reflection, adds that "Brandeis himself establishes his own
voice as that of a teacher" (p. 155).
If Brandeis taught by example in Olmstead, elsewhere he showed
that he knew how to teach by authoritarian precept. In Whitney v.
California, 9 for example, he lectured his readers on the true meaning
of the first amendment and its adopters' purposes. Similarly, Justice
Black's opinion in the school prayer case of Engel v. Vitale, 10 plainly
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (police wiretapping did not violate fourth amendment because it involved no literal search or material seizure).
8. 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
10. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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addressed to the public at large, is not so much an invitation to a conversation as an exposition ex cathedra of what the establishment
clause compels. Whatever style a Justice may choose, at bottom law is
command, even when it is commanding tolerance of political outsiders
or inclusion of religious outsiders. To the Governor of Arkansas who
sought to keep black children out of Little Rock's Central High
School, the Supreme Court properly spoke in the stern tones of
Authority. 11
Throughout White's analyses of Supreme Court opinions he distinguishes sharply between "votes" or "results" on the one hand and the
opinions of the Justices on the other. Here and there he notes his
awareness that results are important (pp. 95, 157-58), but repeatedly
he sounds the theme that "[t]he great contribution of the judicial mind
is not the vote but the judicial opinion, which gives meaning to the
vote" (p. 91). When he refers to ''judicial excellence" (p. 93) he means
excellence in opinion writing: "[I]n an important sense what distinguishes the work of a good judge is not the vote but the achievement of
mind, essentially literary in character, by which the results are given
meaning in the context of the rest of law, the rest of life" (p. 92). I
think this view undervalues both the importance of consensus-building
in the Supreme Court and the doctrinal and political momentum that
a line of decisions can generate even when they are poorly explained.
In the margin, by the passage just quoted, I wrote: "Earl Warren?".
Brown v. Board ofEducation 12 taught only a minor part of its complex lesson through the medium of its two opinions. Partly because
Warren was seeking unanimity among the Justices, neither opinion exposed what was problematic in the issues at hand. Brown I focused on
education and said nothing about dismantling Jim Crow; Brown II announced the "all deliberate speed" formula as a logistical necessity and
disingenuously disclaimed any political accommodation. In the next
few years, when the Court held unconstitutional a great many forms of
state-sponsored racial segregation, it "spoke" only in grunts: curt orders that offered no explanation beyond citations to Brown L 13 These
decisions, by their results alone, carried meaning of the weightiest
kind. They were new "texts" only in the thinnest imaginable sense,
and yet in the aggregate they amounted to an "acted document"l4 that
expanded the embrace of our national community. If Brandeis was a
great judge, so was Warren.
Henry Hart once recorded his scorn for "shallow-minded lay com11. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (Brown II).
13. See, e.g., State Athletic Commn. v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (state·regulated athletic
contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
14. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 10 (1973).
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mentators" who simply looked at results, "crying, 'One up (or one
down) for subversion,' 'One up (or one down) for civil liberties,' 'One
up (or one down) for states' rights.' " 15 He hoped for a time when
members of the legal profession and others would again understand
"that reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your side." 16
Ironically, the form of reason Hart had in mind was just the sort of
propositional reasoning that White seeks to minimize, as opposed to
the literary way of thinking and talking that enables judges to be translators and builders of community. In our recent history, "One up for
civil rights" has had a dynamic - and a moral force - of its own.
All of us who travel in countries where we lack the language know
that with good will we can go a long way on gestures that are wordless. And even those of us who stay home know that actions often
speak louder than words. The Supreme Court, like other actors both
individual and corporate, teaches not only by what it says but by what
it does.
By putting in a good word for the importance of votes and results I
mean only to emphasize that judicial opiriions are not the whole story
when we think about the excellence of judges as teachers, as· community-builders, even as translators across cultural boundaries. But this
reminder, like my comment on Earl Warren, is a note at the margin of
a book that enlightens at every turn. It is no great failing, after all,
that Leonardo did not fully develop the background of the Mona Lisa.
In his portrait of the judge as translator, White practices what he
preaches. In offering to create a community with his reader, he does
not demand submission but invites the sort of conversation that can
lead to new and more inclusive definitions of the larger communities
they both inhabit. May Ju~tice as Translation find the widest possible
audience of Ideal Readers.

15. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term HARV. L. REV. 84, 125 (1959).
16. Id.

Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73

